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ship,12 joint adventure, 18 and principles of equity 14 as the bases for their
decisions.
The modem trend also permits the putative wife to recover on an implied
contract for services rendered during the supposed coverture.1 5 This view
has been rejected in Massachusetts 16 but has been generally accepted in
other jurisdictions. A few jurisdictions have resolved the problem by statu-
tory enactment of a form of alimony.1T Indications are, however, that the
courts will go no farther in granting relief to a putative wife than dividing
property jointly accumulated, awarding compensation for services rendered
or affording relief in the form of statutory alimony1s The instant case seems
well founded on modem precedent. While it may be argued that this doc-
trine is in derogation of the common law, the adoption of that body of law
does not preclude modification to meet local conditions.19
HAROLD 0. BULLIS
TORTS - CONDITION AND USE OF BUILDINGS - STOREKEEPER'S LIABILITY FOR
THE ACTIONS OF A CROWD. Plaintiff went to the defendant's store in response
to the advertisement of a sale. A large crowd was awaiting the opening of
the store. When the doors were finally opened, the crowd surged forward
and pushed the plaintiff into a showcase, injuring her. The plaintiff sued,
charging that the defendant knew the dangerous propensity of the crowd,
yet delayed the opening so that photographers could get pictures of the crowd
of customers. Negligence was charged in (1) failure to police the premises,
(2) failure to open the door at the advertised hour, (3) failure to rope off
the entrance, and (4) failure to police the entrance to prevent the crowd's
pushing and shoving. It was held, that the pleadings stated a cause of action.
12. Fung Dai Kim Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
278 U.S. 636 (1928) (admitted that technically no partnership, trust, agreement,
express or implied contract existed, but allowed a division of property on the basis
of unjust enrichment); Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30, 190 Pac. 1088 (1920); Werner v.
Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 Pac. 127 (1898): "The court has the same power to make
equitable divisions of the property so accmumulated as it would have in case of the
dissolution of a business partnership."
13. Beuck v. Howe, 71 S.D. 288, 23 N.W.2d 744 (1946) (recovery denied on
ground that evidence did not warrant the conclusion that defendant contributed substan-
tially to acquisition of the property): Bracken v. Bracken, 52 S.D. 252, 217 N.W. 192
(1927).
14. King v. Jackson, 196 Okla. 327, 164 P.2d 974 (1946); Sclamberg v. Sclamberg,
220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942) (incestuous marriage, valid under Russian
law; held, equity has power to grant relief in such circumstances).
15. Cases cited note 7, supra.
16. Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892 (1888).
17. Stapleburg v. Stapleburg, 77 Conn. 31, 58 Atl. 233 (1904) (alimony awarded
under statute permitting the court upon declaring a marriage void to award alimony as
it might have done in a divorce proceeding if the parties were married); Barber v.
Barber, 74 Iowa 301, 37 N.W. 381 (1888) (statute permitting court to decree com-
pensation as in case of divorce if contract entered into in good faith); Vanvalley v.
Vanvalley, 19 Ohio St.' 588 (1869).
18. Ft. Worth & R. G..Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 131 S.W. 400 (Tex Civ. App. 1910)
(reversing a decision permitting a putative wife to recover for injuries to deceased
husband which did not cause his death, holding that to permit recovery would extend
to a putative wife all the rights of a valid marriage); Woods v. Hardware Mut.
Casualty Co., 141 S.W.2d 972 (Tex.Civ.App. 1940) (putative wife not allowed to
claim workman's compensation.)
19. Fung Dai Kim Ah Leon v. Lau Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
278 U. S. 636 (1928).
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Judgement for the plaintiff affirmed. Lane v. Fair Stores, Inc., 243 S.W.2d
683 (Tex. 1951).
Generally a person who enters a store does so at the implied invitation of
the storekeeper,1 and the law imposes upon the storekeeper the duty of
maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition 2 so as not to expose
customers to unreasonable dangers. The storekeeper is under the further
duty to warn such business invitees 3 of dangerous conditions on the premises,
4
including all such conditions which he could discover by reasonable care.5
The courts have made it clear, however, that the storekeeper is not an insurer
of the safety of his customers and is liable only for injuries resulting from
his negligence. 6 Ordinarily a storekeeper is not liable to a customer for
injuries caused by a third person, 7 and the principal case raises the question of
a storekeeper's duty to police a crowd and his liability for its actions.
The early cases consistently held that where one caused a crowd to
congregate on his premises, which were otherwise in a safe condition, and a
member of the crowd was injured through the group's shoving and pushing,
the owner of the premises was not liable.8 It was said that a storekeeper had
a right to believe that customers would act properly in regard to others
in the store, and therefore was not guilty of any negligence by reason of the
1. See Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274, 286 (1866) (Action by business invitee
to recover damages): "The authorities respecting guests and other bare licensees, and
those respecting servants and others who consent to incur the risk, being therefore inapplic-
able, we are to consider the law as to the duty of the occupier of the building with
reference to persons resorting thereto in the course of business, upon his invitation, express
or implied. The common case is that of a customer in a shop; . . . for whether the
customer is actually chaffering at the time or actually buys or not, he is, according to
the undoubted course of authority and practice, entitled to the exercise of reasonable care
by the occupier to prevent damage from unusual danger of which the occupier knows or
ought to know, such as a trap door left open. . . . This protection does not depend on
the fact of a contract being entered into in the way of a shopkeeper's business during
the stay of the customer, but upon the fact that the customer has come into the shop in
pursuance of a tacit invitation given by the shopkeeper, with a view to business that
concerns himself .... The class to which the customer belongs includes persons who
go not as mere volunteers, or licensees, or guests, or servants, or persons whose employment
is such that danger may be considered as bargained for, but who go upon business which
concerns the occupier, and upon his invitation, express or implied."
2. See Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866); Krueger v. North American
Creameries, 75 N.D. 264, 27 N.W.2d 240 (1947) (Plaintiff, a customer, injured in
crash of elevator in Defendant's warehouse).
3. Prosser, Torts, 637 (1941). The author discusses the theories advanced as the
basis of the special obligation of an occupier toward a business invitee.
4. See, e.g., Raylass Chain Stores Inc. v. De Jarnette, 163 Va. 938, 178 S.E. 34 (1935)
(Defendant violated duty to warn Plaintiff of concealed stairway).
5. See note 1, supra.
6. See, e.g., Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Scroggins, 140 F.2d 718, 723 (8th Cir. 1944)
(Plaintiff fell over boxes left in store aisle); Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Peterson, 78
F.2d 243, 246: (8th Cir. 1935) (Plaintiff entangled foot in twine left on floor of store).
7. Pippin v. J. Regenstein Co., 58 Ga. App. 819, 199 S.E. 790 (1938) (Child knocked
down mirror in. Defendant's store, injuring Plaintiff; Defendant held not liable).
8. E.g., F.W. Woolworth and Co. v. Conboy, 170 Fed. 934 (8th Cir. 1909) (Plaintiff
shoved down stairway by sale crowd; no recovery); Lord v. Sherer Dry Goods Co.,
205 Mass. 1, 90 N.E. 1153 (1910); Hunwell v. Haskell, 174 Mass. 557, 55 N.E.
320 (1899) (No duty to guard ordinary stairway imposed by presence of crowd in store).
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crowd's misconduct. 9 He was under no duty-to anticipate violence, 1 0 or warn
of ordinary conditions," merely because his store was crowded. Even an
overt act intended to cause movement of the crowd was held not to charge
the storekeeper with a duty of anticipating danger1 2  Although these
principles have been regarded as long-established, and generally followed,
there now appears to be a tendency of the courts to extend the d'ities and
liabilities of the storekeeper n such situations.
While there is no duty to supervise a crowd under ordinary conditions,1'
the extension of liability in the latter cases seems to be based upon the
premise that there is such a duty to supervise in extraordinary circum-
stances, 1 4 and that a crowd can be, in some situations, a .contributing
instrument of danger which will raise such a duty of supervision. 1 5 The
present view now appears to be that the storekeeper must consider all
pertinent circumstances, such as the condition of the premises, and the size
and conduct of the crowd, in determining what he should do to protect his
patrons.' If he fails to use reasonable care in the light of all the circum-
stances, it would appear reasonable to hold him responsible for the
consequences.' 7 In other cases considering the damming of a crowd in an
entrance way,' 8 proximity to glass, late opening, and failure to supervise, 1 9
recovery has been allowed on the theory that these factors created
extraordinary circumstances involving risk of injury to patrons.
ROBERT M. FAIR
9. See F.W. Woolworth and Co. v. Conboy, 170 Fed. 934, 936 (8th Cir. 1909): "The
crowd on the present occasion seems to have been somewhat more violent than usual.
Still such crowds are often found in large stores at the time of special sales. . . . They are
an unavoidable feature of mercantile life in large cities. The defendant . . . had no
reason to believe that such a sale . . . would lead to any uncontrolled or violent conduct
on the part of customers . . . and was not therefore required to maintain its store in
an unusual condition of safety to meet such' an emergency. It had no reasonable cause
to anticipate such violence, but, on the contrary, had a right to believe that patrons would
demean themselves with a proper regard to others using the store."
10. See note 9, supra.
11. Hunnewell v. Haskell, 174 Mass. 557, 55 N.E. 320 (1899).
12. Lord v. Sherer Dry Goods Co., 205 Mass. 1, 90 N.E. 1153, 1154 (1910): "It
cannot be said however that a merchant is negligent simply because he has his store
crowded with customers, or because while the store is crowded he directs their attention
to some part where they can get good bargains. That is what the store is for. . . . The
stairs were of ordinary construction, and the defendant had the right 'tb assume that
under the circumstances there was no reason to anticipate any danger to those upon them."
13. See Tuttle v. Kline's Inc., 230 Mo. App. 230, 89 S.W.2d 676, 678 (1935) and
cases cited there. (No recovery allowed a plaintiff caught in revolving door by rush
of crowd.)
14. Greeley v. Miller's Inc., 111 Conn. 584, 150 Atl. 500 (1930) (Plaintiff recovered
where Defendant failed to erect barriers to protect store windows and Plaintiff was injured
by glass broken in rush of crowd).
15. Ibid.
16. Schwartzman v. Lloyd, 65 App. D.C. 216, 82 F.2d 822 (1936) (Containing an
excellent review of the cases).
17. Id. at 827: "The public assumes the ordinary risks of ordinary crowds. But if the
crowd is held or handled in a manner likely to cause injury, the storekeeper must use
due care to guard against it. We think that evidence that the flow of a crowd collected
by a defendant has been dammed, whether at a loading platform . . . at a gate . . . or
in a store entry areaway between glass windows . . . without precautions . . . without
barricades, warnings or guards-is evidence from which reasonable jurymen might properly
find that . . . the defendant had invited the public and the plaintiff into danger, without
exercising ordinary care to render the premises reasonably safe for the visit. It is not
unreasonable to expect that windows pressed against by a crowd will break."
18. Schwartzman v. Lloyd, 65 App. D.C; '.,2f6, 82 F.2d 822 .(1936); Greeley v.
Miller's Inc., 111 Conn. 584, 150 Adt. 500 (1930).
19. Greeley v. Miller's Inc., 111 Con.n 584, 150 Atl. 500 (1930).
